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Abstract 
Theories of collective intentions must distinguish genuinely collective intentions 
from coincidentally harmonized ones. Two apparently equally apt ways of doing 
so are the ʻneo-reductionismʼ of Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sugden (2007a) 
and the ʻnon-reductionismʼ of Searle (1990, 1995). Here, we present findings 
from theoretical linguistics that show that we is not a cognitive primitive, but is 
composed of notions of I and grouphood. The ramifications of this finding on the 
structure both of grammatical and lexical systems suggests that an 
understanding of collective intentionality does not require a primitive we-intention, 
but the notion of grouphood implicit in team reasoning, coupled with the individual 
concept I. This, we argue, supports neo-reductionism but poses difficulties for 
non-reductionism. 
 
Keywords we-intentions, team reasoning, pronouns, lexicon, concepts, 
generative linguistics 
 
Word count: 10,400 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we address the nature of collective intentions in light of results in 
generative linguistic theory. To frame the core problem, consider two people 
making hollandaise with one stirring and the other pouring. Their actions, stirring 
versus pouring, are simply enough described. However, the nature of their 
intentions is more complex. The pourer, for instance, does not merely intend to 
pour but intends, additionally, that a hollandaise sauce will result. The stirrer too 
must have this second intention. However, since making a hollandaise requires 
both actions, it may seem that the stirrer intends the pourerʼs actions and vice 
versa. What, then, are the individualsʼ intentions in such cases of collective 
action? 
 Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller (1988) suggest a three-point account of 
collective intention that reduces ʻwe-intentionsʼ to individual intentions together 
with a network of mutual beliefs. Michael Bratman (1992, 1993), pursuing a 
similar intuition, argues that collective action requires ʻappropriate attitudes of 
each individual participant and their interactionsʼ (1993: 99). But according to 
John Searle (1990: 404, see also Searle 1995), ʻno such reduction will workʼ. He 
presents a counterexample to show that there are things that are not shared 
intentions that nonetheless satisfy Tuomela and Millerʼs three criteria. Since then 
Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden (2007a) and Nick Bardsley (2007) have shown 
more generally that, according to the three criteria, every Nash equilibrium counts 
as a we-intention. Michael Bacharach (2006) makes the same point about Brat- 
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manʼs account. The key problem identified by these critiques of reductionist 
accounts is that coincidentally harmonized beliefs are misrepresented as we-
intentions. 
 Searleʼs reaction to such difficulties is to claim that ʻ“we-intentions” are 
primitiveʼ (Searle, 1990: 404; we consider below what kind of primitiveness this 
might be, e.g., biological, psychological, or conceptual). In Gold and Sugdenʼs 
account, grouphood is a primitive part of our mental ontology, that is, the 
collection of concepts humans have evolved to use to explain, plan and 
rationalize individualsʼ behaviour. We-intentions arise when reasoning about 
actions assumes a group subject (rather than the speaker reasoning just about 
him- or herself), the members of which (potentially) subsequently receive 
subsidiary tasks that accomplish the we-intention, that is, the intention of the 
group. On this view, we-intentions are not primitive. 
 Let us term Bacharach, Gold and Sugdenʼs position ʻneo-reductionismʼ and 
the contrasting position that could be associated with Searle, that we-intentions 
are primitives of our mental ontology, ʻnon-reductionismʼ. (The extent of Searleʼs 
commitment to non-reductionism is discussed in section 5, below.) Different sets 
of primitives are demanded by or (in)compatible with these two positions. There 
are five primitives that might be found as evidence for or against the neo- and 
non-reductionistm: (a) I, (b) we, (c) grouphood, (d) team reasoning, (e) we-
intentions. Neo-reductionism assumes (a) I and (c) grouphood as primitives of 
our mental ontology, together with the logical procedure of (d) team reasoning. 
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Non-reductionism assumes the ontological primitiveness of (e) we-intentions. 
Moreover, where neo-reductionism is committed to the non-primitiveness of (b) 
we, which is viewed as a composite of the concepts of (a) I plus (c) grouphood, 
non-reductionism is not so committed. Therefore, if (e) we exists as a primitive of 
our mental ontology, then this counts as evidence against neo-reductionism and 
in potential favour of non-reductionism. 
 In this paper, we turn to findings in generative linguistic theory and linguistic 
typology to assess the plausibility of the commitments and implications of neo- 
versus non-reductionism. We will consider three varieties of data, concerning the 
composition of first person pronouns, the syntax of such pronouns, and the 
structure of the lexicon. These, we argue, directly support the status of (a) I and 
(c) grouphood as linguistic primitives; by contrast (b) primitive we enjoys no such 
support. This means that, whereas the primitives of neo-reductionism enjoy extra 
support from pronominal primitives, there are none that threaten neo-
reductionism or favour non-reductionism. For (d) team reasoning and (e) we-
intentions, we find no supporting linguistic evidence. In the case of (d), this 
appears to be for independent reasons: languages never mark means of logical 
inference or reasoning. However, for (e), there appears to be no independent 
reason why shared intentions could not be overtly marked. This is, therefore, a 
surprising lexical lacuna if we-intentions are indeed primitive to our mental 
ontology. The balance of linguistic evidence thus supports the neo-reductionist 
position against the non-reductionist. 
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 It should be clear that the case mounted below is one of plausibility and 
parsimony, rather than being a definitive demonstration of the untenability of one 
approach to we-intentions. Both neo- and non-reductionism appear equally well 
equipped to differentiate we-intentions from coincidentally harmonized ones (and 
are also equally compatible with the qualia to which Searle affords importance; 
section 4). Therefore, it is necessary to turn elsewhere for further evidence. We 
assume that, to the extent that philosophy of mind aims to understand the actual 
world studied by science (as, e.g., Papineau 2009 argues), it is desirable that our 
philosophical theories be consistent with our best scientific theories and data. 
Moreover, we assume that the study of cognition should, insofar as possible, be 
conducted as a unified whole, with the results of one area being regarded as 
relevant for the study of others, unless arguments are made to the contrary. So, 
even if linguistics may seem far from debates about we-intentions, we regard it 
as relevant in principle and in practice to researchers whose concern lies with the 
theory of collective intentions. And what the linguistic evidence shows is that the 
primitives of neo-reductionism enjoy independent corroboration, whereas 
primitives endangering neo-reductionism or supporting non-reductionism do not. 
Given the simple assumption that a theory with primitives deployable in 
explanations of a wide range of data is preferable to one that extends only to part 
of that data and that leads to unsubstantiated expectations elsewhere, we 
conclude that there is more support for neo-reductionism than non-reductionism. 
 Our argument is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the neo- and 
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non-reductionist accounts, as well as the interpretation of Tuomela and Miller in 
reaction to which they arise. We also demonstrate that both accounts distinguish 
we-intentions from coincidentally harmonized ones. In section 3, we present the 
first two types of linguistic evidence⎯the structure and syntax of pronouns such 
as I and we⎯that pertain to the primitives posited by or (in)compatible with each 
theory. This presents evidence for the primitives I and group, and against we. 
Empirically, though, this constitutes quite a narrow slice of language. So, in 
section 4, we consider the structure of the lexicon, where languages register 
many concepts that are irrelevant to the domains of morphology and syntax 
considered in section 3. We argue that there are good grounds for believing that 
absence of primitive we and we-intentions from this domain entails their absence 
from our cognitive primitives more generally. Finally, in section 5, we discuss the 
implications of these results not just for non-reductionism, but for the various 
interpretations that Searle suggests for the notion of primitiveness in his works. 
 
2. A problem of primitives 
Let us begin by stating the problem and proposed solutions in greater detail. 
When two people make hollandaise sauce, with one stirring and one pouring, 
they are said to have a collective intention: that is, in addition to the pourerʼs 
intention to pour and the stirrerʼs intention to stir, both stirrer and pourer must 
have the intention to produce hollandaise sauce as the joint result of their 
individual actions. The collective intention is, therefore, more than the mere sum 
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of their individual intentions, i.e., more than the stirrerʼs intention to stir plus the 
pourerʼs intention to pour. These two individual actions can only have the effect 
of producing a hollandaise if properly coordinated, and not, for instance, if the 
pourer is by the sink and the stirrer by the hob. Alternatively, two sauciers in 
neighbouring restaurants might well make batches of hollandaise at the same 
time, but the sense in which We are making hollandaise sauce holds true for 
them is quite different from that in the stirring-pouring scenario, as each is 
engaged in a separate activity, the outcome of which does not depend on the 
otherʼs action: if one saucier fails, the other can still succeed, but if one of the 
stirrer-pourer pair fails, then so must the other. In sum, coincidentally harmonized 
actions are not joint actions and coincidentally harmonized intentions are not 
collective intentions. 
 Analyses of collective intentions attempt to articulate what differentiates the 
intentions associated with joint actions from other intentions. A dominant strand 
of research (e.g., Tuomela and Miller 1988; Bratman 1992, 1993) attempts to 
reduce collective intentions to individual intentions and beliefs, and the relations 
between them. Tuomela and Miller, for instance, suggest a three-part reduction, 
the essential features of which can be illustrated with respect to a two-member 
group, {P1, P2}.1 Consider some ʻjoint social actionʼ, A, which comprises the 
                                                
1 Tuomela (2009) argues that Searleʼs and subsequent interpretations of 
Tuomela and Miller focus too narrowly on their three points and miss the 
intrinsically cooperative nature of we-intentions, which allows the Tuomela-Miller 
 9 
subactions A1 and A2 for the respective individuals. According to Tuomela and 
Miller, P1 has a we-intention with respect to A if: 
(i) P1 intends to do A1,  
(ii) P1 believes that P2 will do A2,  
(iii) P1 believes that P2 believes that P1 will do A1, and so on (p. 375)  
Observe that (i) is an intention of P1, (ii), a belief of P1, and (iii), a belief of P1 
about anotherʼs belief. As the same beliefs are held, mutatis mutandis, by P2, the 
account reduces we-intentions to individual intentions and a network of mutual 
beliefs. 
 A problem for such reductive accounts, first pointed out by Searle (1990), is 
that (i)–(iii) may be satisfied in cases where the Pi do not plausibly have any 
shared intentions. That is, such accounts ʻovergenerateʼ. Searleʼs own example, 
                                                                                                                                            
account to avoid the problem of coincidental harmonization. We repeat Searleʼs 
interpretation of Tuomela and Miller because it is a part of the historical dialectic 
and it makes obvious the problem faced by reductionist accounts of we-
intentions. We use the terms ʻnon/neo-reductionistʼ in an historical sense, to refer 
to accounts that respond to Searleʼs critique of reductionism and, at this stage, 
our aim is to outline these two approaches that explicitly avoid the issue of 
coincidental harmonization. Hence, for the moment, we leave aside the issue of 
how much of neo-reductionism is implicit or explicit in Tuomela and Miller (1988). 
However, we return to the issue later, both at the end of this section and in 
section 5. 
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concerning a business school, might reasonably be felt to be at the margins of 
likelihood,2 thus leading skeptics to wonder whether counterexamples to 
reductive accounts only arise in similarly arcane cases. However, Gold and 
Sugden (2007a) show that the problem is quite general: (i)–(iii), or their 
analogues in other accounts, characterize every Nash equilibrium as a case of 
collective intentionality. In a Nash equilibrium, each individualʼs action is a best 
response to their true beliefs about the othersʼ actions. Since these are 
intentional actions, this is equivalent to saying that each individualʼs intention is 
adapted to their true beliefs about the actions and intentions of the other. Thus 
the criteria for being a we-intention are satisfied. But, in many cases, the Nash 
                                                
2 Searle (1990: 404–405) shows that Tuomela and Millerʼs (i)–(iii) are satisfied in 
the following scenario: ʻSuppose a group of businessmen are all educated at a 
business school where they learn Adam Smithʼs theory of the hidden hand. Each 
comes to believe that he can best help humanity by pursuing his own selfish 
interest, and they each form a separate intention to this effect; that is, each has 
an intention he would express as “I intend to do my part toward helping humanity 
by pursuing my own selfish interest and not cooperating with anybody.” Let us 
also suppose that the members of the group have a mutual belief to the effect 
that each intends to help humanity by pursuing his own selfish interests and that 
these intentions will probably be carried out with success. That is, we may 
suppose that each is so well indoctrinated by the business school that each 
believes that his selfish efforts will be successful in helping humanity.ʼ 
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equilibrium does not involve a collective intention. Reductionist accounts 
mischaracterize such cases. 
 
     Player 1 
     stag    rabbit 
Player 2   stag  (10, 10)   (7, 0) 
   rabbit (0, 7)   (7, 7) 
 
Figure 1: Stag hunt 
 
 We illustrate this with the stag hunt game (figure 1). Consider two hunters 
who can hunt either stag or rabbit. Rabbit provides a small amount of meat, but 
can be caught by one person. Stag provides more meat, but requires two people 
to catch one. Thus, if one player hunts stag and the other, rabbit, the stag-hunter 
will go hungry. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game: (stag, 
stag) and (rabbit, rabbit). The players each get a higher payoff in the (stag, stag) 
equilibrium. However, the (rabbit, rabbit) equilibrium has the property of ʻrisk 
dominanceʼ (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988); intuitively, hunting rabbit is the safer 
strategy because, regardless of the other playerʼs action, the rabbit-hunter will 
never go hungry. In evolutionary models, the system generally tends to the risk 
dominant equilibrium in the long run. Suppose it is common knowledge between 
P1 and P2 that, in stag hunt games, players usually choose rabbit. Then the 
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intentions involved in P1ʼs action are: 
(i) P1 has the intention to choose rabbit  
(ii) P1 believes that P2 will choose rabbit  
(iii) P1 believes that P2 believes that P1 will choose rabbit 
Thus, according to Tuomela and Millerʼs three points, the risk-dominant Nash 
equilibrium constitutes a collective intention. However, this is wrong: (rabbit, 
rabbit) is clearly not a collective action involving a collective intention, as, in the 
sketched scenario, each player can hunt and catch their own rabbit separately. 
Moreover, by both choosing rabbit, each receives a yield of 7, whereas, if they 
had truly formulated a collective intention, it would surely have been to play stag, 
for a higher yield.3 
 Tuomela and Miller (1988) qualify the three-point account, saying that it only 
applies to situations where it can be presumed that the agents are engaged in a 
ʻjoint social actionʼ. Tuomela (2009) clarifies how this would exclude Nash 
equilibria that do not involve collective intentions. Whether or not Tuomela and 
Millerʼs account is ultimately successful, examples like the stag hunt show that 
                                                
3 Whether (stag, stag) must involve a collective intention is a separate question. 
Sometimes a given pattern of behaviour can be intended either individually or 
collectively. For instance, there is a dispute amongst primatologists about 
whether packs of hunting chimpanzee act collectively or whether each hunter 
merely places himself in a position that makes him most likely to catch the prey, 
given where the other hunters are positioned (Tomasello, 2008). 
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accounts of collective intentions need to avoid mischaracterizing coincidentally 
harmonized intentions as collective intentions. (Searleʼs business school 
example, note 2, provides a non-game-theoretic illustration of the same point.)4 
 Searleʼs response to the problem of overgeneration is to claim that no such 
reduction as Tuomela and Millerʼs will work. Bacharach (2006) comes to a similar 
conclusion about reductionism following his critique of Bratmanʼs (1992, 1993) 
analysis. Instead, Searle regards collective intentions as ʻprimitiveʼ. Indeed, in 
later work, he writes that ʻCollective intentionality is a biologically primitive 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something elseʼ 
(Searle, 1995: 24, our emphasis). Bacharach, by contrast, suggests that the 
distinctiveness of collective intentions consists in being the result of a particular 
                                                
4 We do not discuss Bratmanʼs account here because he explicitly differentiates it 
from the analyses provided by Tuomela and Miller and Searle, saying that his 
shared intentions are states of affairs made up of the interrelated intentions and 
beliefs of the people who share them; they are not intentions of a special kind, 
held by individual agents (Bratman 1993: 107). Gold and Sugden (2007) address 
the relationship between Bratmanʼs account, team reasoning, and Tuomela and 
Millerʼs and Searleʼs approaches. They argue that Bratmanʼs analysis of shared 
intention can be understood as an account of group agency (a disposition to 
reason and act as a member of a group), which comes prior to group membersʼ 
deciding how they will coordinate their actions so as to achieve their goal, that is, 
prior to the object of Tuomela and Millerʼs and Searleʼs analysis. 
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method of reasoning. Gold and Sugden (2007a) expand on this point, arguing 
that collective intentions are those that result from ʻteam reasoningʼ, where the 
individual first determines what the group as a whole should achieve (ʻWhat 
should we do?ʼ) and then works out their part in the best team plan (ʻWhat should 
I do?ʼ).5 On this view, in addition to team reasoning, reference to the group and to 
I are ineliminable parts of the process of forming a joint intention.6 
 Searleʼs non-reductionist and Bacharach-Gold-Sugdenʼs neo-reductionist 
views are, at least prima facie, incompatible. Searle expands on his notion of 
primitiveness by saying we ʻsimply have to recognize that there are intentions 
whose form is: “We intend to perform act A”; and such an intention can exist in 
the mind of each individual who is acting as part of the collectiveʼ (Searle, 1990: 
414, double quotation marks added). On the Bacharach-Gold-Sugden view, 
collective intentions are not primitive parts of our mental ontology, that is, the 
collection of concepts by which individualsʼ behaviour is planned, rationalized, 
and explained; nor are they biologically primitive. (See section 5 for further 
                                                
5 See Gold, in press, for an account of how team reasoning could lead to 
cooperation in the stag hunt. Gold and Sugden (2007b) show how team 
reasoning could lead to cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma. 
 
6 Bacharach, couching his account in terms of rational choice theory, argues that 
both the group utility function and the individual utility function are primitive. 
Modulo talk of utility functions, this amounts, we believe, to much the same thing. 
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discussion.) 
 Despite this incompatibility, both the non-reductionist and the neo-
reductionist positions cope equally well with the problem of Nash equilibria. 
Searle says that we-intentions cannot be reduced to I-intentions because ʻThe 
notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, implies the notion of 
cooperationʼ (Searle, 1990: 414, italics in original). Given that P1 does not intend 
to cooperate with P2 to achieve (rabbit, rabbit), there is no collective intention on 
the non-reductionist account; and given that there is no reasoning by P1 about 
what the group consisting of P1 and P2 should do, there is no team reasoning and 
hence no collective intention on the neo-reductionist account. So, for evidence 
that discriminates between the accounts, we may have to look beyond the 
domain of the current debate. 
 One obvious quarter from which such evidence might come is experimental 
psychology, which might be able to prove or disprove that we use ʻteam 
reasoningʼ as a mental process (see, for instance, Colman, Pulford, and Rose, 
2008, and Guala, Mittone, and Ploner, 2009). A related, non-experimental 
approach would be to identify the cognitive capacities that are required by 
different theories and to investigate whether the amount of cognitive 
sophistication required is congruent with that possessed by the agents to whom 
the theory is supposed to apply (see Pacherie 2011). However, an alternative to 
seeking support for the mental process proposed by Gold and Sugden (2007a) is 
to seek support for their primitives, I and group. This is the approach we pursue 
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in remainder of this paper, drawing on findings from generative and typological 
linguistics.7 
 
3. Linguistic evidence of our mental ontology 
Our basic assumption, following Donald Davidson (1967, 1973), Richard 
Montague (1970), and much subsequent work, is that natural language is 
compositional and that the atoms of such composition cast light on the concepts 
that form part of our mental ontology (where knowledge of language and our 
mental ontology are understood internalistically following, e.g., Chomsky 1986). 
Humans share an inventory of atoms and of algorithms that operate on such 
atoms and it is the task of generative linguistics, as a branch of cognitive science, 
to discover what these are and, where possible, to explain why they have such 
properties as they have. (See Ramchand 2008 for a recent, highly articulated 
                                                
7 It is possible that non- and neo-reductionism engender quite different research 
agendas with respect to non-human collective action, particularly where such 
behavior involves (in contrast to simple pack action) distinct, learned skills 
contributed by different expert participants, as has been documented in, for 
instance, hunting by dolphins and killer whales. Collective action as a biological 
primitive suggests a search for biological homologies across humans, cetaceans, 
and possibly other animals. Collective action as a form of reasoning, by contrast, 
suggests a search for the relevant cognitive subcapacities. Whether these 
research agendas would remain distinct in practice, however, is far from obvious. 
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application of this approach in the domain of verb meaning.) 
 Amongst these atoms are some that pertain to quantity and number and 
others that pertain to persons. It is these atoms that, in more complex 
combinations, yield what we normally call pronouns and, in those languages that 
have it, agreement. In the domain of person and number, where language after 
language attests relevant data in the shape of pronouns and/or agreement 
paradigms, the programme of generative linguistics is to find the set of shared 
atoms and algorithms that generate all systems that we see attested, whilst 
avoiding overgeneration, the prediction of unattested systems. Of course, it is 
only with respect to robustly attested, tightly circumscribed phenomena that we 
want to rule out generation of unattested systems. Person (to which a putative 
primitive I belongs) and number (to which a putative primitive group belongs) are 
precisely such well attested and circumscribed domains (Corbett, 2000, Cysouw, 
2003, Bobaljik, 2008). Given the substantial theoretical investigation of this 
domain by linguistic theoreticians (e.g., Hale, 1973, Silverstein,1976, Noyer, 
1992, Harley and Ritter, 2002, Harbour 2007, 2011b), natural language is an 
ideal testing ground for the primitives of the neo-reductionist account.8 
                                                
8 Atoms, as the innate concepts that we build our thoughts up out of, are not 
culture-specific nor are they learned (though their usage may exhibit a maturation 
phase). As such, distinctions such as those between I and others, or between 
count and mass, differ from those between mugs and jugs or computers and the 
internet which may involve prototypes and sets of beliefs. 
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 Our main claim will be that there is substantial evidence for neo-reductionist 
primitives (sections 3.1–3.2) and none for a primitive we-intention. If anything, 
there is evidence against the latter position (section 4). The data we adduce in 
support of the primitives group and I centers on the form of the word ʻweʼ in 
diverse languages (section 3.1) and its behavior in different grammatical 
constructions (section 3.2). Our purpose is to present the data in such a way as 
to lead to a natural understanding of the primitives that are available to 
grammatical cognitive systems.9 
 Implicit in our reasoning is the assumption that primitives of grammar are 
available also to other cognitive systems, such as those implicated in intention 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
9 A reviewer objects that the linguistic notion of group merely concerns pluralities, 
whereas the groups that engage in joint action are conceptually more complex. 
This disparity is not problematic. On Gold and Sugdenʼs view, the specialness of 
joint intentions arises from making a plurality the subject of a reasoning process, 
to the result of which all group members, if they were to reason qua group 
member, would assent. Of course, a separate debate can be pursued on the 
notion of assent, asking, for instance, whether all members need to reason or 
whether it suffices for some to endorse the outcome of othersʼ reasoning or their 
parcelling out of subsidiary tasks. However, this debate concerns a philosophical 
notion distinct from that under analysis here. 
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sharing and action planning. There is, of course, the possibility of mismatch 
between the primitives available to grammatical and non-grammatical systems. 
One instance of this is the neo-reductionist concept of team reasoning: no 
language that we know of marks propositions that result from team reasoning in 
any special way. However, this is part of a much broader and, to our knowledge, 
absolute tendency that languages never mark mode of inference (such as modus 
ponens, and-elimination, etc.). So, this represents a primitive (of the reasoning or 
planning system) for which there is no linguistic evidence. In contrast, we do not 
believe that it is plausible to appeal to the possibility of such mismatch in defence 
of the non-reductionist position as, unlike modes of reasoning, jointness of action 
and intention is a category that can be linguistically indicated. Assuming we-
intentions to be a primitive leads to incorrect expectations about the structure of 
the lexicon (section 4). (Further possible interpretations of Searleʼs non-
reductionist position are discussed in section 5.) 
 
3.1 Basic Arguments 
Let us begin with languages in which the word for ʻweʼ is obviously not simplex 
(i.e., is morphologically complex). If we look at how such languages construct 
their we-words, we find (a) that we is constructed from I, and (b) what is added to 
I in such cases is either a straightforward plural or an element meaning group or 
something similar. Thus, I and group are the primitives from which we is derived. 
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 The pattern of adding a plural to I is well attested.10 We present three 
examples from two different geographical areas (three distinct language families). 
In Mandarin Chinese, the word for ʻIʼ is wǒ, which is contained in the plural 
counterpart for ʻweʼ, wǒmen. The same suffix is found in other plurals, such as 
                                                
10 By ʻwell attestedʼ, we mean that it is a linguistically significant minority pattern, 
not confined to just one or a few regions, languages, or families. A reviewer 
points out that Daniel (2005) counts 15% of sampled languages as following the 
pattern of adding a plural to I. Although far from a statistical majority, this number 
is reassuringly high as evidence for the morphological composition in question. 
(To make a proper assessment of the significance of this number, an issue 
orthogonal to our concerns, one needs to measure something different—which 
no typological study has, we believe, ever attempted, probably for reasons of 
tractability—namely, how frequently separate grammatical categories fuse into 
one morpheme rather than being realized by separate morphemes. For instance, 
the Latin dative plural of ʻleaderʼ, prīncip-um, is in no morphologically 
straightforward sense the addition of a plural morpheme to the dative singular 
prīncip-is. This contrasts with, say, the Turkish dative plural of ʻhouseʼ, ev-ler-e, 
where the plural morpheme, ler, is clearly added to the dative singular, ev-e. To 
make sense of the figure of 15%, we would need to know the extent to which 
languages fuse versus the extent to which they separate person and number with 
other categories, such as gender and case, in order to establish a general 
baseline for fusion versus separation of person and number crosslinguistically.) 
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laǒshǐ (men) ʻteacher(s)ʼ and xué́sheng(men) ʻstudent(s)ʼ (Chappell, 1996). In 
Vietnamese, formal and informal words for ʻIʼ, respectively, tôi and mình, are 
again subparts of the formal and informal words for ʻweʼ, chúng tôi and chúng 
mình. As in Mandarin, the added element, chúng, is found in other singular-plural 
pairs, such as nó ʻ(s)he/it (non-adult)ʼ, chúng no ́ ʻthey (non-adults)ʼ (Ngô, 1999). 
Finally, in Miskitu (a Misumalpan language of Nicaragua), the difference between 
ʻI fellʼ, yang kauhwiri, and ʻwe fellʼ yang nani kauhwiri, is the element nani. The 
same element is used to derive the plural from the singular, as in aras (nani) 
ʻhorse(s)ʼ (Green, 1992). 
 Not all languages with constructed we-words add the plural to I to create 
we. Instead, some add a noun, or similar element, with a meaning like group. We 
give two examples, again from distinct language families and geographical areas. 
In Thai, pûag rao ʻweʼ explicitly contains the word for ʻgroup, party, communityʼ. 
(The same word may be added to káo ʻ(s)heʼ to create pûag káo ʻtheyʼ; Becker 
2006.) In Japanese, the element added to the words for ʻIʼ, for instance, boku or 
watashi, to produce ʻweʼ is tatji: bokutatji, watashitatji ʻweʼ. More literally, the 
meaning of these terms is ʻMe and my associates/groupʼ. The same element may 
attach to proper names, like John, to produce Johntatji ʻJohn and his 
associates/groupʼ (Nakanishi and Tomioka, 2004). Thus, we is constructed, in 
some languages, from I plus some group-like element. 
 The evidence just presented creates a strong case for the idea that we is 
constructed out of two more basic notions, namely, I and the concept of plurality 
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or grouphood⎯precisely the Gold-Sugden primitives. However, such constructed 
weʼs are noteworthy for a second reason. The languages above add to the 
singular to create the plural (as English does for common nouns, like pig(s)). In 
other languages, by contrast, one finds nouns for which the plural is the primitive 
from which the singular is constructed, such as moch ʻpigsʼ / mochyn ʻa pigʼ in 
Welsh (Jones, 1991); áá ʻtreesʼ / áádau ʻa treeʼ in Kiowa, a Kiowa-Tanoan 
language of Oklahoma (Harbour 2007); and sínkır ʻfishʼ / sínkirrî ʻa fishʼ in the 
Maasai dialect of Maa, a Nilotic language of Kenya (Corbett,2000).11 Given the 
possibility of constructing singulars out of plurals, we must recognize, as a logical 
possibility, that some languages might construct I out of we and a ʻsingularizerʼ 
like Welsh -yn, Kiowa -dau, or Maasai -rî. 
 We have shown that, if we take the primitives of the neo-reductionist 
account and treat them as linguistic primitives, we are immediately able to 
characterize some well attested linguistic patterns. By contrast, the neo-
reductionist position might be threatened if we were also a basic entity: primitive 
                                                
11 We omit gender prefixes from the Maasai Maa examples, for reasons of 
simplicity. The phenomenon is further attested in the Uto-Aztecan and Semitic 
families, and, according to an audience member at LSE, in Dutch. So this 
appears to be a linguistically significant, statistically minor pattern. A possibly 
related phenomenon (see, e.g., Acquaviva, 2008) is the existence of morphemes 
that render non-atomic mass nouns countable, as in Arabic qamḥ ʻwheatʼ / 
qamḥat ʻgrain of wheatʼ, baqar ʻcattleʼ / baqarat ʻcow (head of cattle)ʼ. 
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we might be taken as the pronominal counterpart or entailment of primitive we-
intentions, thus favouring the non-reductionist position. It is striking, then, that, in 
the extensive literature on pronominal systems (e.g., Corbett 2000, 2006, 
Cysouw 2003, Siewierska 2004), and despite the existence of plural-to-singular 
derivations, no language has been found that derives singular I from plural/group 
we. Although some languages ʻsingularizeʼ common nouns, no languages 
ʻsingularizeʼ pronouns. 
 Now, the claim that we-intentions are primitive does not commit one to the 
claim that the pronoun we is primitive and that I derives from it. (One might, for 
instance, claim that we and I are both primitive, or that we-intentions are primitive 
and that pronouns are quite orthogonal; positions we argue against in sections 
3.2 and 4 respectively.) There is, nonetheless, a notable disparity in terms of how 
comfortably the two accounts of collective intentions sit with some fairly basic 
linguistic evidence. More importantly, basic principles of parsimony strongly 
support any account, the primitives of which can be directly imported into another 
domain. Given that the neo- and non-reductionist positions are equally able to 
distinguish coincidentally harmonized intentions from collective intentions, it is 
precisely with respect to such non-core data that they can most sensibly be 
evaluated. To defend the non-reductionist account by ignoring such data is 
contrary to standard scientific practice. (See section 4 for empirical arguments 
against the non-reductionist position.)12 
                                                
12 A reviewer suggests that, if we talk about ʻcollective intentionsʼ rather than ʻwe-
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3.2 Non-Basic Arguments 
Anyone reading this article will, of course, be aware that not all languages base 
their words for we on I, as this sentence illustrates for English. One might, 
therefore, think that one type of evidence is being preferentially treated: if the 
existence of constructed pronouns counts in favor of we not being cognitively 
primitive, then the existence of non-constructed pronouns should count in favor of 
we being primitive after all. As suggested in the previous two paragraphs, this 
position might be taken as natural pronominal corollary of the claim that we-
intentions are primitive. 
                                                                                                                                            
intentionsʼ, we would expect the pronominal correlate/entailment of non-
reductionism to be the collective, that is, grouphood, rather than primitive we. 
Given that the pronominal evidence does not exhaust the empirical case against 
non-reductionism, this alternative is not lethal for our case. However, it is a 
questionable interpretation for independent reasons. First, as discussed in 
section 4, Searle places significance in the qualia associated with collective 
intentions. For there to be qualia, there must be an experiencer. Consequently, 
we are not just dealing with grouphood, but with speaker-inclusive grouphood, 
that is, with we. Second, a different reviewer suggests that it is not open to Searle 
to assume grouphood as a primitive given his methodological individualism (for a 
discussion of the relation between Searleʼs methodological individualism and his 
account of collective intentionality, see Fitzpatrick 2003). 
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 In fact, it is easy to explain this disparity. The phenomenon whereby a 
complex form (such as we) is not merely the pronunciation of its primitive parts (I 
plus plurality/grouphood), is known as suppletion (or fusion). Besides we, it 
affects plural formation in common nouns, such as goose/geese in English, ʼišah 
ʻwomanʼ / našim ʻwomenʼ in Hebrew, and bičʼni ʻsack cornerʼ / boždo ʻsack 
cornersʼ in Archi (a Lezgian-Samur language of Dagestan). Furthermore, 
suppletion occurs in many grammatical domains beyond plurality. For instance, in 
English, the past tense of go is suppletive, went (not goed), as are the 
comparative and superlative of good/better/best (not good/gooder/goodest). The 
phenomenon of suppletion simply concerns an irregular relation between 
meaning and pronunciation: the plural of some nouns is not pronounced as 
noun+plural, but as an irregular, one-off, fused form (similarly for the past tense 
of some verbs, the comparative of some adjectives, and so on). This does not 
cause one to revise oneʼs view of what primitives there are, but merely to 
recognize that meaning and pronunciation are not always perfectly correlated. 
Therefore the pronunciation of I and we is sometimes unrevealing of the 
primitives out of which they are built. 
 Interestingly, however, even in languages where we is not constructed from 
I plus group, one can still find evidence for I being the more primitive. We present 
two grammatical phenomena that show this. To do this, some simple concepts 
from linguistic theory are required. (Readers less concerned with linguistic detail 
should nonetheless briefly familiarize themselves with the basic theory 
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immediately below, as it is relied on in section 4.) 
 
3.2.1 Some Basic Theory. The arguments presented below rely on two key 
concepts of theoretical linguistics: features and underspecification. 
 Features are the atomic units out of which pronouns (and other elements) 
are built. They are understood to be predicates, P, that may either be asserted 
[+P] or denied [−P]. Below, we require reference to two features: [±speaker] and 
[±singular]. These mean, respectively, ʻdoes (not) contain the speakerʼ and ʻis 
(not) singularʼ. Thus, in terms of these features, I is [+speaker +singular] and we 
is [+speaker −singular]. 
 Underspecification is a means of economizing on information. For instance, 
the feature matrices for I and we are oppositely specified only for one feature, 
[±singular]. So, they can be simplified in one of two ways: 
(a) I = [+speaker]  we = [+speaker −singular]  
(b) I = [+speaker +singular] we = [+speaker] 
The idea behind underspecified feature matrices is that the unspecified features 
are understood by default. In (a), for instance, I is understood as being 
[+singular], even though there is no overt feature signalling this. 
 The data from Mandarin and like languages shows that the 
underspecification in (b) cannot be correct, for a very simple reason. The 
pronunciation of we in all the cases is larger than that of I. As what is pronounced 
is the features, Mandarin-style we must contain more features than I. (If (b) were 
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correct, we would expect I to be we plus something extra, which, as already 
observed, does not arise for these pronouns.) 
 Conversely, (a) derives precisely the relations we observe. If wǒ meant 
[+speaker +singular], one of two problems would arise. Either, wǒ could not be 
used to pronounce ʻweʼ [+speaker −singular], as wǒ contains [+singular] but ʻweʼ 
does not. Or else wǒmen would be contradictory, on the assumption that men 
means [−singular], for then wǒmen would mean [+speaker +singular −singular] = 
ʻcontains the speaker and is singular and is not singularʼ. If we assume, as in (a), 
that wǒ means just [+speaker], and if men means [−singular], then the 
pronunciation of ʻweʼ [+speaker −singular] is wǒ, the pronunciation of [+speaker], 
together with men, the pronunciation of [−singular]. 
 With these basics in place, we now turn to two different phenomena. In both 
cases, our presentation will be the same and will proceed in three stages. (1) We 
introduce the phenomenon. (2) We develop it as a diagnostic for 
underspecification, using first versus third person. Above, we considered only 
underspecification of number (singular versus plural). Applied to person, the 
notion of underspecification is, simply, this: If the pronouns I/we/(s)he/it/they are 
specified for [±speaker], then first person (I/we) must be [+speaker] and third 
person ((s)he/it/they) must be [−speaker]. However, we can treat third person as 
the default interpretation that arises in the absence of specification. It may, in 
consequence, be underspecified for [±speaker] (cf, Benveniste 1966 amongst 
many others). To show that the phenomenon is diagnostic of underspecification 
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means that it distinguishes between fully specified and underspecified 
pronouns.13 (3) We apply the diagnostic to singular versus plural, to show that 
singular is underspecified, plural not. This demonstrates that I has a more basic 
representation than we and that we is constructed from I and other elements. 
 
3.2.2 The Person Case Constraint. (1) The first phenomenon we are concerned 
with is a well studied and extremely well attested one. We illustrate it first with 
respect to English. English has two nearly synonymous constructions for 
ʻditransitiveʼ verbs like show, give, present, introduce, and so on: the 
ʻprepositional dativeʼ, She showed them to him, and the ʻdouble object 
constructionʼ, She showed him them. Interestingly, when the direct object (the 
thing shown) is first or second person, only the prepositional dative is possible: 
for instance She showed me to them, but not She showed them me. The person 
case constraint is the restriction that in the double object construction, when a 
ditransitive verb takes two pronominal objects, the direct object (in this case, me, 
the thing shown) must be third person. 
                                                
13 A background assumption in this discussion is that languages may differ in 
point of which features they underspecify. In section 3.2.2, we see that number 
may be underspecified in Romanian, where it interacts with the person case 
constraint, though not in French, where it does not. In section 3.2.3, we see that 
number may be underspecified in Dhirari, and like languages, where it interacts 
with ergative marking, though not in Georgian, where it does not. 
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 For certain technical reasons, the effect is somewhat subtle in English: the 
unacceptable sentences are, for some speakers, only mildly degraded. In most 
languages where it is attested, however, the aberrant sentences are far more 
robustly rejected. One such language is French. In sentences such as ʻShe 
showed them the bookʼ and ʻShe showed me to the professorʼ, ʻthemʼ and ʻmeʼ 
may be represented by the object pronouns leur and me. One therefore expects 
ʻShe showed them meʼ (i.e., me to them) to use both leur and me. However, Elle 
me leur a montré́ is in fact ungrammatical, and, as in English, a preposition (à, 
and a different form of ʻthemʼ, eux) must be used: Elle mʼa montré à eux. 
Although both the languages just discussed are Indo-European, the person case 
constraint is found across the world (see, e.g., Haspelmath 2002). 
 
(2) The person case constraint connects to underspecification on a wide variety 
of analyses (e.g., Anagnostopoulou 2003, Béjar and Řezáč 2009, Adger and 
Harbour 2007). These essentially argue that the double object construction is 
able to cope only with a certain quantity of features and, if it is overburdened by 
the direct object, ungrammaticality results. That is, pronouns that are ʻtoo bigʼ, in 
sense of having too many features, are ungrammatical as the direct object. We 
explained above the standard view that the first person must be specified 
[+speaker], but that third person may be underspecified. It follows, therefore, that 
the person case constraint is a diagnostic of underspecification: fully specified 
pronouns are unacceptable as direct objects (hence, the difference between the 
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acceptable She showed them him and the degraded She showed them me). 
 
(3) There is a core set of properties to the person case constraint that is invariant 
crosslinguistically (for instance, the unacceptability of me leur, them me). 
However, in some more subtle cases, languages do vary as to which 
combinations of pronouns are ungrammatical. One strand of this variation 
concerns number. It has been observed that, if speakers find a difference in 
acceptability between singular and plural pronouns, then it is the singular that is 
acceptable. So, for instance, Nevins and Să̆vescu (2008) show that, for some 
Romanian speakers, ʻgiving you usʼ is unacceptable, but ʻgiving you meʼ is not. In 
(2), we said that fully specified pronouns are unacceptable in such configurations. 
We can straightforwardly account for the difference between plural and singular 
in Romanian, given that ʻmeʼ [+speaker] is underspecified for number, but that 
ʻusʼ [+speaker −singular] is not. 
 
 Now, recall that we are concerned in this section with languages where we 
is not constructed out of I together with some plural or group-like element. 
Romanian ne ʻusʼ is clearly not the pluralization of singular mă̆ ʻmeʼ. Thus, we 
have evidence that, even when plural we is not overtly constructed out of I and a 
plural or group-like element, it is still non-primitive: it is the pronunciation of 
[+speaker −singular], which is, self-evidently, a combination of the primitives 
[+speaker] and [−singular]. 
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3.2.3 Ergativity. (1) Subjects of transitive verbs in many languages receive 
special marking, a case known as the ʻergativeʼ. The case is found, for instance, 
in Georgian (a Kartvelian, non-Slavic/non-Indo-European, language of the 
eponymous country). Compare (a)–(b) with (c): 
(a)  Gogo   midia 
 girl  came in  
 ʻThe girl came inʼ 
(b) Me    gogo  vnaxe 
 I    girl   saw  
 ʻI saw the girlʼ 
(c) Gogo-m   msxali      prtskvena  
 girl-ERG  pear       peeled 
 ʻThe girl peeled the pearʼ  
 
Only in (c) is ʻgirlʼ the subject of a transitive verb; in (a), the verb is intransitive, 
and in (b), the verb is transitive but ʻgirlʼ is the object. In the first and second 
sentences, ʻgirlʼ appears in its basic form, gogo. However, when the subject of a 
transitive verb, it appears in the ergative, as gogo-m. 
 The phenomenon of ergative marking is, in many languages, person-
dependent. That is, some persons receive it, others do not. In Georgian, for 
instance, first persons (me ʻIʼ, čven ʻweʼ) never receive ergative marking, but third 
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persons (gogo-m ʻgirl-ERGʼ, gogo-eb-ma ʻgirl-s-ERGʼ) do.14 
 
(2) Person-dependent ergative marking, although well discussed and 
documented in the typological literature, has not received as much analytic 
attention (in terms of features) as the person case constraint. However, one 
account (Harbour, 2006) ties it to underspecification. The idea is that subjects of 
transitive verbs must be fully specified for person. Consider a language in which 
third person is underspecified for [±speaker]. When a third person is the subject 
of a transitive verb, it will receive an extra feature, [−speaker]. In contrast, nothing 
will be added to first persons, as they are already specified as [+speaker]. The 
pronunciation of such added features yields what is traditionally labeled as the 
ergative. Hence, ergative marking occurs on the third person in such languages, 
and never on first. It therefore follows that, when ergative marking occurs only on 
some (pro)nouns, it is diagnostic of which are underspecified. 
 
(3) Again, as for the person case constraint, the present phenomenon is relevant 
for our purposes because there are languages where number too is a factor in 
determining when ergative marking occurs. For instance, in Dhirari (a language 
of South Australia), the first person singular receives ergative marking, whereas 
non-singular first persons do not. Similar facts hold for Arabana (related to 
                                                
14 The ergative can also be restricted to certain tenses or constructions. In 
Georgian, for instance, it is restricted to (tenses constructed from) the past tense. 
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Dhirari), Gumbaynggir (a language of New South Wales), and Aranda (a 
language of the Northern Territory). This pattern can be easily captured if we 
claim, as above, that singular pronouns are underspecified in these languages. In 
consequence, when they occur as the subject of transitive verbs, the full 
specification requirement will force them to receive an additional [+singular]. The 
ergative in these cases is the pronunciation of this extra number feature. This 
provides a second instance that shows that we has a larger feature specification 
than I, from which it follows that we must be comprised of several features and so 
is non-primitive. Again, recall that we are concerned with evidence for the relation 
of we to I in languages where the former is not constructed from the latter. To 
illustrate, briefly, for Aranda (Strehlow circa 1944: 91–92, diacritics removed), 
that ergative marking may reveal this even where the structure of the forms does 
not, observe that jinga ʻIʼ does change in the ergative (to ata), that ilina ʻwe (two)ʼ 
and (a)nuna ʻwe (more than two)ʼ do not, and that neither of the first two (jinga, 
ata) is a sub-element of either of latter two (ilina, (a)nuna). 
 
4. Cognitive exhaustion 
The evidence presented above converges on the view that I and grouphood are 
primitive notions and that we is constructed out of them. However, if we attempt 
to use this conclusion to decide between the non-reductionist and neo-
reductionist accounts of collective intentions, there is an obvious 
counterargument to be faced, namely, that there is a primitive we concept, or we-
 34 
intention concept, but that the grammatical systems concerned with the 
phenomena presented above do not have access to it. Absence of linguistic 
evidence for such a primitive does not evidence its absence from all cognitive 
systems (cf, the modularity hypothesis of Fodor 1983). 
 This counterargument relies, in part, on the view that features used to 
represent pronouns in grammatical systems do not exhaust all our pronoun-like 
concepts. We argue in this section that there is strong evidence against this 
position. That is to say, personal pronouns amount to nothing more than 
pronunciations of the features manipulated by the syntax, semantics, and 
morphology. We present two arguments, showing that there is an exact fit 
between the features posited by linguists and the pronominal inventories attested 
in natural languages. To explain the significance of this exact fit, and why it 
entails that we cannot be an independent pronominal primitive, we first discuss 
the nature of the lexicon, as a store for information that goes beyond purely 
featural content. In so doing, we articulate a view of the nature of the lexicon 
(see, e.g., Ramchand 2008 for more detail), one corollary of which is that we-
intentions are highly unlikely primitives of our mental ontology. (This is an 
important aspect of the argument for researchers who, concerned with the 
ontology of collective intentions, may wonder why they have wandered so deep 
into the domain of pronouns.) 
 At first glance, the claim that linguistsʼ features and languagesʼ pronouns 
match would seem unsurprising, as failure to match would indicate that linguists 
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had not adequately accounted for their data. However, this is to misapprehend 
what features do in linguistics. If we look at the lexicon of any given language, we 
find words for many concepts: cat, dog, fourteen, fifteen, blue, green. It is, of 
course, a real task to explain the difference in meaning between these pairs of 
terms. However, the explanation of these differences does not rely on positing 
features, such as [±canine], [±even], [±primary]. Rather, features are only posited 
where there is evidence that a given distinction is made by the syntax or other 
grammatical systems. Non-featural distinctions, that is, ones that have no impact 
on the grammar, are said to reside in the lexicon (they are ʻencyclopedicʼ in the 
sense of Marantz 1997; see Fodor 1977 for an early formulation). 
 Let us explain this distinction in slightly more detail. To speak English 
competently, one must know the difference between cat and dog, fourteen and 
fifteen, and blue and green. However, the differences between these pairs are 
entirely irrelevant for syntax, semantics and morphology, the linguistic systems 
that depend on features, as we now illustrate: 
 
Syntactic phenomenon: passivization. No language is known in which one can 
passivize verbs done to cats, but not ones done to dogs (that is, in which The cat 
has been fed is grammatical but The dog has been fed is not).  
 
Semantic phenomenon: quantifier scope. No language is known in which 
fourteen may have wide-scope and narrow-scope readings, but fifteen only 
narrow-scope. That is, no language is known in which All the girls know fourteen 
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boys might mean, in semi-formal notation, either [∃14y : B(y)] [∀x : G(x)] (K(x, y)) 
ʻThere are fourteen boys—Andy, Billy, ..., Neddy, say—and all the girls in 
question know themʼ; or [∀x : G(x)] [∃14y : B(y)] (K(x, y)) ʻAll the girls in question 
know fourteen boys, but each girlʼs set of fourteen may be distinctʼ; however, for 
fifteen only the latter type of reading would be available, [∀x : G(x)] [∃15y : B(y)] 
(K(x, y)) ʻAll the girls in question know fifteen boys, but each girlʼs set of fifteen 
may be distinctʼ.  
 
Morphological phenomenon: ability to agree (e.g., reflect the singularity/ plurality 
of a noun). Languages differ in whether, and when, adjectives agree: for 
instance, in German, the endings of the adjectives are different in blaues/grünes 
Papier ʻblue/green paperʼ versus blaue/grü̈ne Papiere ʻblue/green papersʼ; 
however, the adjectives are invariant in the English translations. Thus, German 
adjectives agree, but English ones do not. Such morphological differences are 
common. However, no language has been found where blue, and related hues, 
agree but green, and related hues, do not.  
 
Being grammatically inert, the differences between cat and dog, fourteen and 
fifteen, and blue and green are not featurally represented. Instead, they are 
confined to the lexicon. 
 The counterargument with which we began suggests that pronouns and we-
intentions might be like animals, numerals, and colours: they might be 
characterized by differences in meaning that are represented in the lexicon but 
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not in the feature system. If this were the case, then failure to find featural 
evidence for the primitiveness of we might indeed still leave open the possibility 
that we, or we-intentions, are primitive in other cognitive systems. We reject this 
position for the following reasons. (We concentrate first on primitive we, from 
which the argument against primitive we-intentions emerges naturally.) 
 First, the most complex person systems that languages attest comprise four 
distinctions. We illustrate this with the dual-number pronouns of Tok Pisin (Papua 
New Guinea; Foley, 1986), which, as an English-lexified creole, makes these 
differences in meaning particularly apparent to English speakers. 
 
  first inclusive  yu-mi-tu-pela (me + you) 
first exclusive  mi-tu-pela  (me + him/her) 
  second   yu-tu-pela  (you two) 
  third    em-tu-pela (they two) 
 
There are, however, several pronominal meanings beyond these four that 
languages could plausibly distinguish in the lexicon. One such is ʻyouʼ where all 
addressees are present, versus ʻyouʼ where only some are. Notice that this 
resembles the very frequent crosslinguistic distinction in object deixis: that near 
you, and that far from you, cf, Scots that hill, yon hill; and it would be a 
linguistically practical device for creating group cohesion, a major factor 
influencing linguistic usage (and the object of study of most of sociolinguistics). 
Extensive surveys have found no evidence of any such lexicalization (Cysouw, 
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2003, Bobaljik, 2008). More striking in connection to this study, is the absence of 
a ʻchoricʼ, or ʻmassʼ, we. A sentence like We ran the race can be true in two quite 
different senses: if the race was a marathon, then every member of the group ran 
individually; if the race was a relay, then every member of the group cooperated. 
Failure of one person in the relay scuppers the race; failure of one person in the 
marathon does not (cf, the pouring-stirring scenario of Searle 1990 and the duet-
singing of Bratman 1992). Group supplication (in the form of prayer, or petition 
writing) is another scenario where the existence of such pronouns is plausible. 
However, extensive surveys have again found no language in which such choric 
or mass we is specially lexicalized (Cysouw, 2003, Siewierska, 2004). Yet, again, 
from a sociolinguistic perspective, one can easily imagine the role such pronouns 
could have in establishing group identity and cohesion (though some authors 
dissent, see e.g., Wechsler, 2010). The fact that such plausible pronouns do not 
exist argues strongly that the lexicon does not contain any pronouns beyond 
those that the linguistically relevant features permit. 
 However, a stronger result obtains, concerning the sets of pronouns that a 
language may contain. Obviously, not all languages make so many distinctions in 
their pronouns as Tok Pisin. English makes only three distinctions, conflating first 
inclusive and first exclusive into a general first person (we). Other languages 
have even more impoverished pronominal systems: for instance, Winnebago 
conflates first inclusive, first exclusive, and second person (i.e., English we and 
you) under nee and uses ʼee for third person only. Let us call the English system 
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a tripartition, and the Winnebago system, a bipartition. Logically, there are 6 
possible tripartitions, and 7 possible bipartitions. Of these, only 1 tripartition and 2 
bipartitions are attested.15 
 Harbour (2011a) models such variation by proposing two features. 
Logically, these generate five systems (there being four possible subsets of two 
features, with two possible orders of semantic composition, if both features are 
                                                
15 A partition refers to the total set of distinctions that a language makes in the 
verbal or pronominal domains (for instance, English pronouns and the verbal 
paradigm for be constitute tripartitions). However, languages may syncretize, i.e., 
pronounce identically, distinct partition elements within a given paradigm (for 
example, the English verb be shows a tripartition, 1⏐2⏐3 ≅ am⏐are⏐is, but in the 
plural all partition elements are pronounced identically, {1, 2, 3} ≅ are). Some 
attested syncretisms are not possible partitions, that is, they do not occur across 
the verbal or the pronominal domain of language as a whole but only in isolated 
verbal or pronominal paradigms (for instance, {1, 3}⏐2 is not a possible partition 
though the syncretism does occur, for instance, in German for a subset of verbs, 
viz., modals and preterites, e.g., singular kann⏐kannst, plural kö̈nnen⏐kö̈nnt). 
Given that syncretisms arise via different mechanisms from partitions (see, e.g., 
McGinnis 2005), it is important to bear the distinction in mind, especially when 
approaching, say, Cysouw (2003), where the concern is explicitly with 
syncretisms within paradigms, not simply with partitions. 
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active). Harbour shows that each of these sets is used by some language. This 
result is important, as it means that the feature inventory generates only attested 
sets of pronouns⎯a non-trivial result that has eluded previous researchers (e.g., 
Noyer 1992, Halle 1997, Harley and Ritter 2002).  If, as the counterargument 
proposes, we were a separate, primitive concept, capable of independent 
lexicalization, then it could be added alongside any feature system. As we 
already have a feature set that generates all the attested systems, adding an 
extra primitive is unnecessary. Moreover, given that the feature set generates 
only the attested systems, adding an extra primitive predicts unattested systems. 
This is a major problem because, as said above, the avoidance of overgeneration 
is a principal objective when linguists propose feature systems. 
 We conclude that, in addition to not being a primitive of the grammatical 
system, there is no primitive, innate ʻweʼ concept that is represented in the 
lexicon. 
 Moreover, the evidence suggests that there is no primitive ʻwe-intentionʼ 
concept in the lexicon. Implicit in the first argument against primitive we⎯that 
choric we is never lexicalized⎯is the assumption that useful concepts have a 
propensity to be lexicalized. It is striking, then, that literature on pluractionality 
and on the expression of intention has noted no language in which we-intentions 
receive specialized lexical expression. This certainly cannot be because the 
concept is not useful (non-useful concepts rarely spawn their own research 
domains), nor because it is so arcane that we are generally unaware of collective 
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intentions (witness our ready ability to appreciate that the narrow interpretation of 
Tuomela and Millerʼs three-point account founders on Nash equilibria). It is 
genuinely surprising, then, that no language has different means of expressing 
our having a we-intention (to make hollandaise sauce cooperatively, say) versus 
our all having distinct individual intentions (to make separate batches of 
hollandaise). Rather, the means that languages employ to express collectivity are 
not specific to the expression of we-intentions; instead, they are more general 
elements that may be co-opted for such usage. For instance, together, though it 
may express the we-intention of Weʼre making hollandaise (together) may 
equally characterize such non-intentional situations as The shoes are lying 
together at the top of the stairs and I canʼt put the pieces back together (similarly, 
jointly occurs in such non-intentional, but nonetheless related, uses as jointly 
distributed variables and these origins lie jointly in social requirements of human 
groups and in the fecundity of liminal experiences).16 
                                                
16 Although no language distinguishes a special we concept, some languages do 
distinguish between collective readings and non-collective readings of verbs with 
plural subjects. Strikingly, where languages make this distinction, it is multiple 
individual intentions, not joint intentions, that receive special expression. A 
ʻdistributiveʼ is added in order to indicate that each member of the plurality is 
acting individually. However, like the English word together, the distributive is not 
confined to expression of intention but may generally apply to non-intentional 
actions and to actions that are diffuse in ways other than being performed 
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 This argument therefore replicates that made at the end of section 3.1. It too 
shows that positing we-intentions as conceptual primitives leads to 
unsubstantiated expectations about the structure of natural languages. However, 
the current argument is much stronger and more general than the earlier version. 
The earlier argument concerned only pronominal correlates and compatibilities of 
non- and neo-reductionism. Here, however, the argument applies to the 
expression of we-intentions in language tout court, not through the narrow lens of 
pronoun structure, and we find that the purportedly primitive concept is 
unexpressed even where languages exercise their greatest expressive freedom 
with respect to concepts, namely, in the lexicon. 
 By denying that we-intentions are primitives or, indeed, entities in our 
cognitive representations of joint action, the neo-reductionist approach provides a 
natural account of this lexical lacuna. A non-reductionist might object that team 
reasoning is also unexpressed in the lexicon, so it seems that we are not treating 
neo-reductionism and non-reductionism symmetrically (since we do not claim that 
the absence of any marking of team reasoning is a problem for the neo-
reductionist). However, as we said above, team reasoning is not expected to 
receive special lexical expression because, beyond the specialized world of logic 
and philosophy, means of reasoning are never lexically expressed: languages do 
not mark whether an assertion has been arrived at by modus ponens, ∃-
                                                                                                                                            
separately by the members of a group (for instance, by being performed at 
distinct times or locations). 
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elimination, and so on. 
 Finally, we recall an earlier statement, that the lexicon is a core locus for 
representation of cognitively salient entities. This is worth recalling because a 
non-reductionist might object that, if the lexicon provides no evidence of we-
intentions tout court, then it cannot provide evidence of we-intentions as 
primitives of our mental ontology, which might suggest an implicit bias in the 
methodology pursued above. However, we observe simply that one does not 
know, before looking, whether languages lexicalize we-intentionality or not and 
so absence of we-intentions from non-technical lexicons (as opposed to those of 
analytic philosophy) is ontologically suggestive, not methodologically detrimental. 
 
5. Implications of the linguistic evidence for the primitiveness of we-
intentions 
Although we have been arguing against non-reductionist approaches to we-
intentions, the implications of the foregoing argument for Searleʼs position 
depend on what exactly he means when he says that we-intentions are primitive. 
There is a weak sense in which the Bacharach-Gold-Sugden view is consonant 
with Searleʼs (beyond their rejection of joint intentions as networks of mutually 
shared individual intentions and beliefs). If we take Searleʼs ʻprimitiveʼ to mean 
ʻexplanatorily priorʼ, then there is no disagreement: before the individual intention 
(to stir or pour, or to hunt stag or rabbit), comes the collective intention (to make 
hollandaise, or to go stag-hunting together). Some of Searleʼs exposition might 
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be seen as supporting the idea that he means ʻexplanatorily priorʼ: 
The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing 
(wanting, believing, etc.) something together, and the individual 
intentionality that each person has derived from the collective 
intentionality that they share. 
        (Searle 1995: 24–25, his emphasis) 
  
 Searle does not specify how I-intentions are derived from we-intentions. 
However, both Gold and Sugden (2007a) and Tuomela (2009) discuss how this 
might be done. Gold and Sugden use schemata of practical reasoning. Tuomela 
(2009), expanding on the notion of ʻjoint social actionʼ which supplements the 
three-point reduction of Tuomela and Miller (1988), explains that agents already 
have a ʻjoint intentionʼ between themselves, that they accept the intention 
expression ʻwe will do Xʼ (or ʻwe will do X togetherʼ), from which the individual we-
intentions in their heads are derived, using inference schemas. So, if Searle 
simply intends ʻprimitiveʼ as ʻexplanatorily priorʼ, then his account is compatible 
with neo-reductionism, with the linguistic evidence and with Tuomela and Millerʼs 
account. 
 However, Searleʼs use of the term ʻbiologically primitiveʼ, as well as the fact 
that his is a counterproposal to (one reading of) Tuomela and Millerʼs account, 
strongly suggests that he intends a different, innate sense of ʻprimitiveʼ. 
Moreover, he expands on his thesis that we-intentions are primitive by saying 
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that we ʻsimply have to recognize that there are intentions whose form is: “We 
intend to perform act A”; and such an intention can exist in the mind of each 
individual who is acting as part of the collectiveʼ (Searle 1990: 414; double 
quotation marks added).17 This, combined with the claim that we-intentions are 
biologically primitive, suggests that Searle intends a sense of primitive that is at 
odds with the view that collective intentions arise via a reasoning process that 
presupposes group and I as primitives. 
 In The Construction of Social Reality, Searle gives his positive argument 
against analyzing we-intentions in terms of I-intentions and other mental states. 
He says, ʻThere is a deep reason why collective intentionality cannot be reduced 
to individual intentionalityʼ: ʻThe problem ... is that it does not add up to a sense of 
collectivityʼ (Searle 1995: 24). To understand this statement fully, one must bear 
in mind Searleʼs broader commitments in the philosophy of mind. He argues that 
                                                
17 Similar notions feature in Tuomelaʼs (2009) defense of his earlier account, 
which he claims has been misunderstood. The result is a position very close to 
Searleʼs in that agents ʻaccept the statement “We will do X” as expressing both 
their joint intention (when read collectively) and their individual we-intentionsʼ and 
in that the account presupposes an ʻirreducibleʼ and ʻpreanalyticʼ notion of we-
intention: ʻA minimal intuitive idea here is that the participants are supposed to 
function as a group or as one agent and to appropriately coordinate or bind 
together their activities both in their reasoning and acting as group membersʼ (p. 
293). 
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mental states are, in part, differentiated by their ʻqualiaʼ, or qualitative feel (Searle 
1992: 41–43). Thus, we-intentions are ʻprimitiveʼ because of their distinct 
phenomenology.  
 So understood, Searleʼs non-reductionism (in terms of mental states) is not 
necessarily opposed to Bacharach-Gold-Sugden neo-reductionism (in terms of 
concepts). Quite simply, we may grant Searle his phenomenology but claim that 
the peculiar qualia are associated with, for instance, having arrived at a plan via 
team reasoning or by having intentions involving the linguistic/cognitive primitive 
group. Whether or not we-intentions are analysable in terms of other mental 
states is a different question from whether or not they are analysable in terms of 
other, innate concepts and if the linguistic evidence, conjoined with the theory of 
team reasoning, shows that group is an ineliminable part of the formation of we-
intentions, then this might be precisely how a sense of collectivity comes in.18
 If, however, Searle intends ʻbiologically primitiveʼ to indicate parity between 
we-intentions and such cognitive primitives as I and group, then the evidence 
from linguistic theory and the structure of lexicon seems strongly to be against 
him. 
 
6. Conclusion 
                                                
18 That said, a reviewer questions whether Searleʼs methodological individualism 
allows him to posit grouphood as a cognitive primitive. See Fitzpatrick 2003 for a 
critique of Searleʼs position in this regard. 
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Theories of collective intentions must be able to distinguish collective intentions 
from coincidentally harmonized ones, an issue which we have referred to as the 
problem of overgeneration. Searleʼs response to the problem of overgeneration is 
to claim that we-intentions are ʻprimitiveʼ, a non-reductionist position. Bacharach, 
Gold and Sugden, in contrast, propose a neo-reductionist account, according to 
which we-intentions arise by schemata of reasoning employing the primitives I 
and grouphood. To evaluate the accounts, we have broadened the discussion of 
mental ontology to include the kinds of primitives that are relevant to linguistic 
theory. The neo-reductionist primitives find direct and diverse support from 
linguistic theory, which speaks strongly in favour of such accounts. A primitive 
pronominal concept we, which might constitute potential evidence for non-
reductionism or against neo-reductionism, enjoys no corroboration from linguistic 
theory, and both it and the primitive posited by non-reductionist accounts, 
namely, we-intentions, lead to incorrect expectations concerning the structure 
and content of the lexicon. If Searleʼs notion of ʻprimitiveʼ is intended to afford we-
intentions the same foundational cognitive status as I, group and team reasoning, 
then we conclude that his account is problematic. If, however, his notion of 
ʻprimitiveʼ applies only to the qualia associated with having we-intentions, then 
this is not only compatible with the evidence presented here, but might be better 
understood in its light: the qualia in question are those that attach to intentions 
derived via team reasoning, and the irreducible collectivity of such intentions (the 
fact that they are not the mere sum of individualsʼ I-intentions) arises from the 
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irreducible role that grouphood plays their derivation. 
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